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An adjunct-DP in  the free instrumental case occurs in a number of surface positions where 
the DP is  syntactically optional. does not depend on any  element in the sentence, and has a 
number of different interpretations. We introduce Bailyn's proposal which postulates a uniform 
syntactic environment for all the uses of instr. This calls for a uniform semantics of these DPs 
which can nevertheless accomodate the different interpretations.  Starting with the hypothesis 
of Roman Jakobson  about the  semantics of the  instrumental case we  formulate  a semantic 
interpretation theory based on  abduction.  We  give  a uniform  semantics for  three different 
adjunct uses of instr in this framework.  In the concJuding part of the paper we discuss some 
possible alternatives and ramifkations as  weH as questions and objections raised with respect 
to the treatment proposed in this paper. 
1.  Explaining the problem: how are free DPs in instrumental interpreted in 
Russian? 
Russian has six morphologically distinguishable cases  I. DPs in the nominative or accusative 
are usually interpreted in the positions of verb arguments,  where their interpretation can be 
easily described as  basically that of a (generalised) quantifier which binds the occurrence of 
an argument variable of the verb.  Instrumental case occurs in a number of surface positions 
where a DP is syntactically optional and does not depend on any element in the sentence. This 
use may be termedfree (DPs in the) instrumental case.  The syntactic role of a free DP in the 
instrumental is usually that of an adjunct. 
We start by showing these uses, describing the problem of interpretation which these free 
DPs pose and our assumptions about the syntactic environment in  which instr occurs in the 
uses we intend to examine.  We choose a proposal which postulates a uniform environment 
for all the uses of instr,  introduce the hypothesis of Roman J akobson about the semantics of 
the instrumental case and forrnulate our technical semantic interpretation apparatus which is 
based on abduction.  Then we formalise some selected uses of DPs in the instrumental and 
explain those properties of them which seem to be amenable to the treatment proposed. In the 
concluding part of the paper we discuss some possible alternatives and ramifkations as weil as 
questions and objections raised with respect to the treatment proposed in this paper. 
The problem is how to characterise the semantics of such free DP adjuncts in the instru-
mental.  The number of their rather different possible interpretations is great and we do not 
want to ascribe every such meaning to all possible DPs in instr, creating an  unrnotivated and 
extreme polysemy. The move to assign some kind of meaning to the instrumental case, similar 
to the meaning of apreposition, is slightly better, but it nevertheless simply shifts the problem 
of extreme polysemy to this case meaning.Wierzbicka (1980), for instance, argues that there are 
seventeen very general meanings of instrumental. 
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We see this problem as apart of the larger problem of how to construct meanings in context. 
Consequently,  we will  propose  a treatment which constructs these meanings from  different 
ingredients in the context of interpretation. We will use an abductive theory of interpretation in 
this treatment. 
Some of the occurrences of the instrumental illustrating the difficulty will be reviewed now. 
We  shall abbreviate the name of the morphological case-form to  instr and the corresponding 
bunch of morpho-syntactic features  as  INSTR. The example is  taken from Jakobson (1936) 
reprinted in Jakobson (1984). The translations ofthe DPs in the instrumental are in italics2  The 
brackets introduce the terminology. 
(I)  a.  On el  reb' onkominstr ikru 
He ate childINSTR  caviar 
He ate caviar as a child (temporal 1) 
b.  On el  pudamiinstr ikru 
He ate PUdINSTR  caviar 
He ate caviar by the pood (36Ibs) (manner) 
c.  On el  lozkojinstr  ikru 
He ate SPOOnINSTR caviar 
He ate caviar with a spoon (instrument) 
d.  On el  dorogojinstr ikru 
He ate roadINSTR  caviar 
He ate caviar on the way (path) 
e.  On el  utrominstr  ikru 
He ate morningINsTR caviar 
He ate caviar in the morning (temporal 2) 
f.  On el  gresnyminstr delominstr  ikru 
He ate sinfulINSTR matterINSTR caviar 
He ate caviar I am sorry to say (idiomatic) 
The italicised prepositions clearly show that different relations between the DP in the instru-
mental and the rest of the sentence are involved. All these uses seem to be syntactic adjuncts.3 
It is not obvious what the second term related to the DPs in instr should be, what the relations 
are and how they are associated with the syntax. 
J  akobson proposed an interesting hypothesis to the effect that the meaning of the instrumen-
tal arises from its opposition tu some other case forms in Russian on the one side, and from the 
interaction with the context on the other side: 
...  The instrumental itself denotes nothing more than peripheral status; it occupies 
the same position among the peripheral cases than the Nominative does among the 
full cases: that of the unmarked category ....  Everything other than peripheral status 
is given in individual uses of the I by the actual meaning of its referent and by the 
context, but not by the case form (Jakobson, 1936). 
2  The literal translation of the idiom would be sinful matter. 
3  We da not insist that they are DP-adjuncts, however. In fact, we will use a different syntactic adjunct structure 
of which the DP is apart. 
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While we do not seek to explain all the uses of instrumental by this hypothesis, we will inves-
tigate what one implementation of this hypothesis amounts to in cases where it seems to apply 
best, i.e.  some of the uses which can be semantically treated as intersective modifiers. We will 
define the term in a moment4 
The uses are Instrumental of transport (which was not listed in (I  f)), Instrumental of path, 
and the two temporal uses in in (lf). 
INSTRUMENTAL OF TRANSPORT. 
(2)  On exal  poezdom 
He  drove train-instr 
He was going by train 
A SPATIAL PREDICATE (INsTRUMENTAL OF PATH). 
(3)  On sei  dorogoj 
He went road-instr 
He was going on the road 
A TEMPORAL ADVERBIAL (I AND 2). 
(4)  Reb'onkom on bolel 
Child-instr  he ill-past 
He was ill as a child 
(5)  Letom  on bolel 
Summer-instr he ill-past 
He was ill as a child 
Sometimes objections are raised to examples like (3) that they are ill acceptable.  The impres-
sion vanishes, if a context is provided.  In  particular, a contrastive context which emphasises 
alternatives makes the example absolutely acceptable. 
(6)  Do reki on sei dorogoj.  Tarn ona konCilas'. 
He walked to the river on the road. There it ended 
There also is a difference between oUf example with a verb of motion and Jakobson's example 
with the verb unrelated to motion.  We will return to this effect in section 4.2. There we shall 
also discuss the restrictions on  D Pinstr in  these constructions.  A theory wh ich ascribes case 
meanings to the instrumental must postulate at least three different meanings associated with 
INSTR, and provide some kind of meaning shift which maps people onto times when they were 
children in addition. 
We  will  argue that an  abductive theory of interpretation allows us  to treat all  these uses 
uniformly as instances of predication on different discOUfse referents denoting participants in 
the situation in a context. So the context-independent meaning of INSTR is very simple, but the 
role of context (inc\uding systematic world knowledge about types of situations) increases. 
4  Following lakobson we assume that  a11  grarnmatical cases of Russian are sorted irrto  two graups, the central 
and  the  periferal  cases.  We  wish to  avoid  formally  reconstructing  lakobson's ideas  on  this  issue hefe, but  see 
Demjjanow and Strigin (1999b) for an partial attempt.  The essenee of lakobson's ideas can be summed up  by 
his quotation" ... what is specific to  the periferal cases is not that they  indicate the presence cf two points in  the 
utteranee, but only that they render one periferal with respeet to the other.. .. [the periferal point] could be omitted 
without impairment to the central one, as is the effect of the periferal cases," 
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1.1.  Where to assign the instrumental case? A syntactic unification. 
lohn Bowers (Bowers, 1993) argued that some interesting syntactic consequences follow, if 
we adopt a special functional projection which is responsible for the predication in the sentence. 
He calls this projection Pr for Predicative element, and assumes (7) as the structure for simple 
clauses of English. It is immaterial at this stage whether I(  nfl) is split into a number of separate 
phrases or not. 
(7)  IP 
/~  e  I' 
/~~ 
IO  PrP 
~ 
DP  Pr' 
//"/ 
prD  VP 
//~ 
DP  V' 
/'/ 
VO  DP 
Here,  the  SpecPr is  the subject of the clause and SpecV is  the direct object of the clause. 
SpecPr is the extern  al argument wrt.  the verb, SpecV is its internal argument.  Bailyn (1995) 
has applied this hypothesis to Russian to account for all non-idiosyncratic uses of instrumental. 
The net effect of this  proposal is  a syntactic uni/kation under wh ich  INSTR is  a structural 
case assigned by Pro, i.e.  the case of predication.  Bailyn applied his proposal to secondary 
predication structures.  The typical case of an  object oriented depictive has then the structure 
given in (8), with Pr  P being an V'-adjunct small clause. 







I-NOM  found  hirn-ACC  drunk-INSTR 
We  shall adopt this hypothesis.  The proposal to  introduce a new functional projection which 
marks predicational aspects did not seem to draw much attention,  and we  shall discuss the 
degree to wh ich our proposal depends on it and whether the structure it postulates can be sup-
planted by a different one in the concluding part of the paper. It should be noted, however, that 
this is  the only proposal known to us wh ich provides a uniform syntactic environment for all 
the uses of the instrumental, which is an interesting hypothesis in its own right. 
That we  adopt this  structure is  not without difficulties,  in  particular considering the use 
we are  going to put it to.  Since Pr  P  is  the  structure of predication we have to provide a 
uniform semantics to  it5.  We will explore the straightforward semantic proposition that all of 
the interesting uses of instrumental are basically predicative on some discourse referent in the 
situation described by the sentence. In wh ich case we have to stipulate that Russian has a kind 
of semantically defined control of P R06.  Ordinarily, PRO is controlled either by the subject 
or by the object or has arbitrary interpretation with a kind of generic reading.  We have to say 
how the semantic control works in Russian. 
We intend to analyse these three uses of instr as adjunct small clauses Pr  P. For the moment 
we mayaiso accept the assumption that these small clauses in the cases we want to analyse are 
adjuncts to IP in (8). 
1.2.  Interpretation 
An interpretation of a sentence S with a D Pinstr includes 
Bowers provides a predication semantics for his proposal in case of English. Thc predication relation is defined 
in the property theory. This sernantics is clearly insufficient for Russian, since the predication Bowers is concerned 
with covers only cases of secondary predication with the subject Of with the direct object as a controller. 
6  Already Nichols (1982) proposed that there is a control relation at work in secondary predication in Russian. 
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•  the determination of the relation between the interpretation of 11 D Pinstr  11  and the inter-
pretation of the rest of the sentence; 
•  the determination of the information status of this relation and of the 1  1  DPinstr 1  I· 
Broadly speaking, we are interested in the semantic and in some systematic pragmatic aspects 
of the interpretation of a sentence 8 with a D P in 1. Since oUf conception of interpretation does 
not consider the difference between semantics and pragmatics be a difference of kind and rather 
emphasises the similarities, this attention to both aspects is explainable. 
As far as the determination of the relation between the interpretation of 1  1  DPinstrl 1  and the 
interpretation of the rest of the sentence is concerned, we make a model case,  as  we al ready 
noted.  We  proposed that the uses of D Pinstr in  (2,  3,  4 5) to be weil described in terms of 
introducing an intersective modifier on situations. 
Situations are theoretical entities and will need justification. For the moment we may think 
of them as states of the world being described by sentences and consider the terms referring to 
them as explicit reference to models. 
(9)  A DP in instr in a sentence 8  is an intersective modifier on situations, if 
it is interpreted by IIDP;nstrll  in (I 1  DPinstr 1  1  & 118'11)(s)  where 8' is 8 
without the D Pinstr. 
An intersective modifier on situations is then simply a predicate on situations, like the sentence it 
wh  ich it occurs or the matrix sentence which is obtained by dropping the modifier. The modifier 
by train is a predicate on situations collecting those ones in which someone is going by train. 
The matrix sentence Peter is going is a predicate on situations in each of wh  ich Peter is going by 
some means somewhere. So the conjunction of the two makes the interpretation of the sentence 
with the intersective modifier.  Thus, if Peter is going by train, then any situation making the 
sentence true would contain Peter who is going somewhere and is doing so by train. Obviously 
some kind of temporal indexing is involved in the notion of situation for this definition to make 
sense. We assurne such an indexing implicitly for the moment. 
The definition provides some semantic properties we should look for in the sentences in 
question. Thus, we should have (1IDP;nstrll & 118'11)(s) F 118'11 (s), since each conjunct follows 
from a conjunction.  That the modifier itself does not constitute a complete sentence is  not 
detrimental. We may use some paraphrase, e.g. it was by train in Peter was going to London. It 
was by train. Note that we must stick to the same situation on both sides of the F sign. 
On this understanding of situations as models their explicit mentioning is not essential, be-
cause explicit statements about models are made in the meta-Ianguage. In this case the situation 
argument could be dropped.  As we shall see there is  a use for a slightly different notion of 
situation, and therefore we shall retain the argument. 
To begin with, (3) and (2) seem to satisfy OUf expectations about entailments. The example 
with the train was  already  discussed above.  Example (3) also satisfies them:  if someone is 
walking on a road, he is walking and he is on the road.  Consider now (4). If  someone was ill 
as  a child, s/he was ill at some time.  And she was a child.  The laUer entailment is somewhat 
tautological for people, but we may substitute direktor (director) for reb'onok (child), and obtain 
(10). 
(10)  Direktorom  on bolel 
Director-instr he ill-past 
He was ill when he was the director 
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With this sentence, the entailment seems to be more readily obtained: he was a director at some 
time or other. 
But now let us add a quantifying adverb, e.  g.  (11). 
(11)  Reb'onkom on casto bolel 
Child-instr  he often ill-past 
He was often ill as a child 
We have a difficulty with the expected entailments: the sentence (11) without the D Pinstr mod-
ifier does not follow from (11).  It was different without the adverb:  clearly,  if someone was 
ill as a child in some circumstances, he was ill at some time under these circumstances.  But 
if someone was often ill as  a child under the circumstances, he need not have been often ill 
in general under these circumstances. The quantificational adverb needs a restrictor.  We seem 
to implicitly change the situation which restricts the quantificational adverb casto (often). The 
only observable change made was to drop the modifier.  Therefore we must conclude that the 
temporal instrumental constrains the restrictor clause in the quantificational structure of the sen-
tence.  Dropping the restriction amounts to changing the reference of the situation term.  Our 
entailment test is  not applicable to  this case, hence it is  actualJy vacuously satisfied.  But the 
problem of the place of instr-modifiers in the quantificational structure of the proposition re-
mains,  and we will return to  it.  This will lead us to determining the pragmatic status of the 
interpretation of intersective modifier D Pinstr' 
2.  The theory 
We understand the hypothesis put forward by Jakobson in the way wh ich alJows us to say 
that we infer the interpretation of DPinstr in the context (where the notion of interpretation is as 
discussed above). We consider interpretation to be an instance of inferential activity. The kind 
of activity we mean is hypothetic inference, often termed abductive inference or abduction. The 
context we mean includes the representational description of the situation the sentence charac-
terises.  Technically we  shall provide such adescription by  giving a discourse representation 
associated with the sentence.  We need to be very explicit, however,  as  far as our understand-
ing of the terms situation and abductive inference are concerned, since they often give rise to 
rnisunderstanding and sometimes to a - in our opinions often misplaced - critique. 
Our general position can be summed up in (12). 
(12)  The hypothesis of interpretation. 
In all the cases under investigation we have an abductive interpretation of the predication 
relation introduced by the syntactic structure [PrP  PRO [Pr,PrO  DPinstr]]  which embeds 
a DPinstro 
We shall now explicate the hypothesis. 
2.1.  Abductive inference 
For simplicity we will ignore here the contexts of interpretation which go beyond simple 
clause.  The formalisation draws on Poole (1989) and Poole (1988).  We consider P to be an 
explanation of  fjJ  according to (13). 
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(13)  rU P explains cf>  if the following holds: 
(i) pur F  cf> 
(ii) pur  is consistent 
Consider r in (14). This is a set of background facts. 
{ 
rained-last-night --->  grass-is-wet } 
(14)  r =  sprinkler-was-on --->  grass-is-wet 
grass-is-wet --->  shoes-are-wet 
If we observe cf>  = shoes-are-wet and want to explain it in  this technical sense, we could 
have two explanations.  The two hypotheses (the explanations) of shoes-are-wet are Pt = 
{rained-last-night} and P2 = {sprinkler-was-on}. We can choose one ofthem. 
The hypotheses may include rules, i.e.  implications.  If  we agree to use rules as hypothe-
ses, whenever consistent, though subject to competition and choice, we have the concept of a 
default rule.  Hypotheses in general are used when there is evidence for them, i.e.  some obser-
vation which requires an explanation. Defaults are simply hypotheses wh ich are used whenever 
possible. 
Consider (15). The hypothesis can be treated as adefault, and if we inquire what can be said 
about the ftying abilities of bob, we have to use the default. 




{  bird(X) --->  jlies(X) }, 
1 
(\lX)(emu(X) --->  bird(X)),  ) 
(\lX)(emu(X) --->  ,jlies(X)), 
emu  (polly ), 
bird( tweety) 
Since we know nothing else about bob,  we  only get a conditional  assertion.  We  know that 
tweety is a bird, so we can explain its ftying.  We cannot explain the ftying of polly, since this 
would contradict the facts. 
This  simple sketch of the use of abduction  suffices for  the  moment to  draw  a sketch of 
interpretation by abduction. 
2.2.  Interpretation by abduction 
In general, what is  interpreted by abduction is  an underspecified semantic representation. 
We must determine where this representation comes from and how the syntactic structure enters 
the interpretation. 
We assume the hypothesis of Logical Form being the contribution of grammar to semantics 
and use the term "the logical form of the sentence" accordingly.  Logical Form is  a level of 
syntactic representation which specifies the propositionally relevant aspects of syntactic struc-
ture. This representation is converted to representations of propositions. The latter are thus very 
abstract semantic va lues of logical forms which we may call semantic forms of sentences. The 
representational module can be called Semantic Form (SF),  by  analogy.  We  will  not specify 
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the conversion algorithm LF - SF,  but but we will assume that a grammatical relation of syn-
tactic structure (i.e. a relation like subject) may be directly associated with a semantic value or 
with a special inference pattern.  Moreover, we split this associated contribution into two parts 
reflecting both the syntactic and the semantic contribution of LF. Thus, we may transcribe the 
proposition  al impact of the subject relation between two nodes in a logical form by introducing 
the relation gjsubject(i,j) whose terms are the discourse referents associated with the nodes. 
The associated semantic value may be specified as  argsubject(  i, j), standing for something 
like i is the argument of  j which stands to it in the subject relation. 
This split has  a  special function.  In interpreting  syntactic structure semantic values are 
input to the abductive component of inference which further specialises them, depending on the 
context they are in, e.g.  on the verb which provides the referent j. The grammatical context 
(things like gjsubject(i,j)  enters the interpretation as facts which may be used to constrain 
the interpretation, but not as observations. Our defaults which are involved in the interpretation 
should therefore be indexed by contexts, e.g. be bound to a lexical entry. 
To write semantic values we use Oiscourse Representation Theory of  Kamp and Reyle, ORT. 
The basic reference is Kamp and Reyle (1993), a more recent one is Kamp and Rossdeutscher 
(1994).  We assume that the syntactic representations which serve as an input for constructing 
semantic representations are Logical Forms (Szabolcsi, 1997, has proposed this approach). LF 
has tree structures labelIed with syntactic information. We shall also assume that subcategoris-
ing syntactic relations are registered in the lexical entries, so that syntactic structures of lexical 
entries are trees. 
As far as the machinery of ORT is concerned, we will refrain as  far as possible from in-
troducing it formally and only provide illustrations in cases where semantic representations are 
necessary. Appendix A contains some basic definitions. 
Under these assumptions (17) is the logical form of (16) and (18) is its semantic representa-
tion in the ORT format. 
(16)  Ja bole! 
I  was ill 
(17)  IP 
~~ 
DP nmn  I' 
I·  /~~ 
Jai  1°  PrP 
~~ 








I-NOM  ill-was 
9 before(ts , now) 
(18) 




ill  (s) 
gfsubject(  u, s) 
The semantic representation records that the situation is the one of being iII, ill  (s). The dis-
course referents (DR) sand ts are introduced by INFL, together with the condition be  fore (  ts , now) 
(ts is the time of the situation). The discourse referent u and the condition myself(  u) are intro-
duced by I. The DR plays the role ofthe subject argument, which is expressed by argsubject(  u, s). 
Moreover, there is arecord coming from the logical form of the sentence that the subject rela-
tion (grammatical function) holds between the two referents indicated,  gfsubject(  u, s). We do 
not distinguish discourse referents in the syntactic relations from those in semantic relations. 
The underspecified interpretation which is the observation to be explained is argsubject(u, s). 
The interpretation is  done by  abductive inference.  We may specialise argsubject(  u, s) in the 
context of the situation s characterised as ill(s) by hypothesising that this relation can be ex-
plained by myself being the theme of the situation of being ill, i.e.  the person who is ill.  This 
may be done using first order theories like (19) and (20). 
(19)  Atheme  - (II) 
II  {  theme(E, X) --+ argsubject(X, S)  } 
(20)  Aill  (r) 
r  { 
ill(S) --+ is - ill(X, E)  } 
is - ill(X, E) --+ theme(E, X) 
The theory in (19) contains adefault to the effect that themes are subject arguments.  Being a 
default, this rule can be overridden by the fact that whenever an agent is present in a situation, it 
will be realized as subjecl. Then another realisation of theme must be codified as adefault, but 
one which is weaker7• The theory in (20) says that a situation s labelIed ill(  s) is built up around 
an eventuality (i.e. process or state) in which someone is is ill, and this individual X plays a role 
classifiable as theme, theme(E, X). The lattercondition mayaiso be rendered by theme(E) = 
X, if the relation is considered to be functional.  The explanation of argsubject(u, s) is given 
by (21), on the assumption that ill(s) holds, i.  e. that this is the situation we have. 
(21)  {is - ill(  u, E), theme(E, u) --+ argsubject(  u, s)} P=  argsubject(  u, s) 
Since we are indeed in the situation ill(s), is - ill(u, E) helps to explain argsubject(u, s). 
Which is to say the sentence is interpreted as I am ill. 
The theory of interpretation sketched here is presented in more detail in Strigin (1999). 
7  Strigin (1999) has a more complete treatment of such a thematic role theory in an abductive framework. 
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3.  Interpreting instr abductively 
Given the abductive framework we sketched, there are two possibilities to proceed with the 
interpretation of the Pr  P. 
3.1.  Interpreting INSTR: First version 
We  could postulate default  rules  which  interpret some underspecified semantic  relation 
R;nstr which is associated with this case as its interpretation. Suppose (22) is such a rule where 
msojtranspart(S, E, X) is  the predicate which is true of a means of transport X in situation 
S which contains some movement event E.  Then (23) is a partial representation of (2).  The 
referents ls, 19 denote the implicit source and goal in S (Kamp and Rossdeutscher, 1994). 
(22)  A.nstr  (f, II) 
II  - {msojtranspart(S, E, X) -> R;nstr(S, E, X) } 
before(t., now) 
(23) 
U, e, z, ls, 19 
he(u) 
move(e, u, ls, 19) 
theme(e) = U 
msojtranspart(  s, e, z) train(  z) 
Under this approach we  must explicitely register all  the  interpretation possibilities of R;nstr 
along the lines  of (22).  The particular hypothesis  is  always available,  but it can only pro-
vide the msojtransport(S, E, X) part of the representation as  an  interpretation of R;nstn  if 
msojtranspart(S, E, X) is already contained in the situation!  What new contribution the rule 
provides is relating train(Y) to msojtransport(S, E, X). The approach predicts that this par-
ticular reading is obtainable in situations which can accommodate it by actually having a refer-
ent for the means of transport. 
A technical point is to specify which structure is interpreted by the relation R;nstr. It can be 
the (abstract) case itself, or the predication structure. 
3.2.  Interpreting INSTR: Second version via predication relation 
We do think that the first approach does not fully exploit the possibilities of abduction. We 
would rather take Rinstr  to be more specific and postulate that it is basically the relation of 
predication which allows to hypothetically identify the subject of predication, cf.  (24).  The 
expression IIDP;nstrll  stands for the interpretation of DPinstr, big X  may be identified with any 
DR in the domain of the representation of situation s. 
(24)  A.nstr  - (f, II) 
II  {  s : X  =  x & IIDP;nstrll(x)  } 
This is  a sweeping claim, since it provides an  interpretation schema for all referents U  E  U 
of the discourse structure with the universe U interpreted in the domain Doms of situation s. 
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We shall see where it will get USo  The colon: delimits the conjunctive condition on situations 
here.  The condition can be taken as the interpretation of the small clause containing DP instr. 
Therefore we must specify i  ts mode of composition. We resort to abduction here, too, by using 
(25). 
(25)  P & q 
q 
(p&q)--+q 
We  can conceive q as  an indication that p&q  is  the case.  If we have no evidence that p and 
q are somehow related,  the assumption p & q seems to  be unwarranted.  But if a number of 
observations established that q is often accompanied by p, then the reverse use of this instance 
of modus ponens amounts to assuming that in the case under observation the situation is the 
same,  though we have no observed data on p.  The point here is  context-dependence of the 
criteria of what is  a good assumption.  Since (p  & q)  --+  q is  a tautology, we can always use 
modus ponens to  make the assumption that p &  q,  given q,  but in  some contexts it is  a good 
hypothesis, in some a less good one.  If I see an  unknown dog  carrying a newspaper in the 
maw, I am inclined to think that the owner must be around, too. If  it were just an unknown dog 
without any embellishments, the hypothesis seems to be ill justified. 
From a somewhat different point of view, we can take (p & q)  to be a hypothesis about the 
relation between p  and q,  given that we have to explain q on  the assumption that p.  There is 
a linguistic sense to this move:  if q occurs in the presence of p, then they probably must be 
conjoined.  An  adjunct can therefore be always conjoined, by  default.  Hence,  this  default is 
an least one possible interpretation of the syntactic adjunct relation.  The conjoined hypothesis 
is  a predicate on  some discourse referent in the universe of the situation.  Since we interpret 
conjunction within the one and the same situation, the situation argument is left implicit. 
We shall adopt this course of investigation and apply it to the three uses of instr. 
4.  The three cases of instr 
4.1.  Instr of transport 
This is  probably the easiest case.  Conjoining a predicate with a DRS amounts to simply 
importing this predicate into it. If  a situation characterised by the DRS contains the referent for 
the means of transport, this referent can be hypothetically taken to be the value of X  in (24). 
(26)  On exal  poezdom 
He drove train-instr 
He was going by train 
S, ts, now 
before(t.,naw) 
(27) 
u, e, Z, ls, 19, w 
he(u) 
move(e,u, ls, 19) 
theme(e) =  u 
msojtransport(  e, z) 
z =  w train(w) 
The proposal also predicts that the reading is only possible with situations which already have 
the appropriate referent. We can check this prediction in (28). 
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(28)  *On spal  poezdom 
He  slept train-instr 
He slept while being transported by train 
The sentence is unacceptable. It is of course quite possible to characterise the situation with the 
help of a locative PP. 
(29)  On spal  v poezde 
He slept in train 
He slept on the train 
The reason for the difference under our theory is  the difference in  the interpreting relations: 
locatives relate events within the situation to a location, whereas the instrumental of transport 
merely identifies two referents one of which is a means of transport. 
There is another curious fact which can probably be explained under the predication inter-
pretation of instr.  If a quantified distributing DP is  put into predicational  instr, the result is 
unacceptable,  cf.  (30).  If we manage to indicate that there  is  a need for the wide scope of 
kazdym poezdom, as in (31), the sentence becomes acceptable. 
(30)  *On exal  kaZdym poezdom 
He  went every  train-instr 
He drove on every train 
(31)  On exal  kaZdym poezdom  dva casa 
He went every  train-instr for two hours 
He drove two hours on every train 
Similar effects are  known for  copula structures in English where quantifying-in gives some 
sentences an acceptable interpretations. 
4.2.  fnslr of path 
The treatment is essentially the same. Some new points of interest arise, however. We have 
(34) as a partial representation of (33). 
(33)  On sei  dorogoj 
He went road-instr 
He was going on the road 
8  Partee (1987) proposed a number of type-shitling operations to aceount for the semantic NP-type ambiguities. 
None of them wauld allow a distributive generalised quantifier like every to be a predicate.  Examples like (32) 
seem to contradict it. 
(32)  This hause has been every colour 
They motivated Partee to  propose that nouns like colaur are predicates of those properties which are  among the 
entities of  the damain of  type e of individuals and (32) are cases of quantifying-in inta contexts forming predicates 
out of properties. 
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bejore(t.,now) 
(34) 
U, e, z, ls, 19, W 
he(u) 
move(e, u, ls, 19) 
theme(e) =  u 
path(e, z) 
z  =  w road(w) 
The availability of the path discourse referent in the representation of the situation is a necessary 
prerequisite, as the pair (35) and (36) shows. 
(35)  On seI  asfaltovoj dorogoj 
He went asphalt  road-instr 
He was going on the asphalt road 
(36)  ?? On spal  asfaltovoj dorogoj 
He  slept asphalt  road-instr 
He was sleeping on the asphalt road 
The example (37)and the fourth example in (lf) seem to contradict this generalisation. 
(37)  On spal  dorogoj 
He slept road-instr 
He was sleeping on the roadlway 
It can be argued, however, that dorogoj (waY-instr) is an adverb.  The semantics of this adverb 
is a generalisation of the part of any situation of movement which contains the referent far the 
path.9  The accommodation of such an  adverb in  case of (37) can proceed by extending the 
representation of any situation which allows some participant to undergo movement simultane-
ously with the main eventuality of the situation. The extension is with that part of the movement 
situation which is associated with the adverb. 
There are some restrictions on what can be a path in this use of instrumental, but they are 
difficult to state. Paths in instrumental should be more or less natural. Thus, if the movement is 
within a city, the city provides a natural path. If, as in case of  perfective verbs, we are interested 
in the state at the end of the path, a city is no Ion ger a good path, whereas a road still is one, cf. 
(38), (39) and (40). 
(38)  On seI  Parizem 
He went Paris-instr 
He was going/walking through Paris 
(39)  *On prisel  Parizem 
He  arrived on foot Paris-instr 
He arrived through Paris 
9  Traditional Russian grammar theory often describes e. g.  temporal uses of nouns in thc instrumental case like 
in (4) as adverbs and speaks of adverbial derivation.  However, Isacenko (1962) noted that this kind of derivation 
does not really allow to form new adverbs. He proposed to characterise thc process of forming occasional adverbs 
as  entstehung (coming irrta  being, emergence) rather  than  derivation.  Same uses of DPinstr gradually become 
adverbialized.  Such development is aseparate topic of investigation, however. 
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(40)  On prisel  dorogoj 
He arrived on foot road-instr 
He arrived via a road 
Similarly for voda (water) in (41).  There is  nothing wrong about water being the surface on 
wh ich the transportation takes pI ace, as (42) shows. 
(41)  ??Oni dobralis do goroda vodoj 
They  reached to  town  water-instr 
They reached the town by water 
(42)  Oni  dobralis do goroda po vode 
They reached to  town  on water-prep 
They reached the town by/through water 
The restrictions become explainable,  if considerations of conceptual characterisations are in-
volved in deciding whether to choose the referent as a good hypothesis.  Thus, Paris probably 
ceases to be a good hypothesis in the context of a telic verb, because it cannot be portioned in 
pieces with a declared end. Similarly for water, but not for roads. 
Quite in  parallel to the use of instrumental to mark means of transportation,  distributive 
quantification with narrow scope is  bad with the instrumental of path,  but not in  general for 
paths, as (43) and (44) show. 
(43)  ??On projexal  kaZdym gorodom 
He  went through every  town-instr 
He went through every town 
(44)  On projexal  po  kazdomu gorodu 
He went through upon every  town-dat 
He went through every town 
4.3.  Temporal instr 1 
The temporal use of instrumental presents more difficulties. We assumed at the start that the 
default mode of  combination of a PredP with the matrix sentence is that of simple conjunction. 
The temporal use is difficult, as  (45) shows, for although the predication is of the subject, the 
sentence does not assert merely the simple conjunction of the matrix sentence and the predicate 
expressed by the DPinstr. Thus, (45) does not simply mean that at some time in the past he was 
a child and was ill. 
(45)  Reb'onkom on bole! 
Child-instr  he ill-past 
He was ill as a child 
The correct interpretation seems to be derived by  constructing a temporal characteristics for 
any modell which is relevant to the evaluation of the sentence on the basis of the direct predi-
cation.  To construct the temporal characteristics we restrict our attention to the time at which 
the  11 D P.:nstr 11  is  true,  i.  e.  restrict the situation (the model) to that time, and then assert the 
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matrix sentence relative to this restricted situation.  This assertion relative to a time cannot be 
adequately rendered by the simple truth-functional conjunction, as  it seems.  The point needs 
some elaboration. 
One way to represent the temporal reading of the instrumental is to postulate a regular lexical 
process forming temporal predicates from temporally dependent nouns. The derived predicates 
should then be used like temporal adverbs, e.g.  yesterday or on May,  21.  The interpretation 
would also be similar e.g.  the  time wh  ich is May,  21  vs.  the  time when x was a child.  The 
conjunction of the matrix sentence and the adverb would yield an interpretation like there is a 
time satisfying the temporal predicate at which the matrix sentence is true. It  is immaterial here, 
that we resort to lexical processes, since we could mimic this lexical process via an inference in 
the context. The point is this would not be adequate. 
First, we noted that (11) violates our expectations about the entailments, and suggested that 
D P;nstr  provided a condition for the restrictor of the adverb of quantification i"asto  (often). 
What we now suggest is that there is a certain quantificational structure of the proposition even 
if there is no adverb of quantification.  The structure of a proposition is always a restrictor and 
a nuclear scope, i.  e.  a predication.  Moreover, we suggest that relativisation is not always a 
conjunct formally speaking. 
Suppose we use a different temporally dependent noun which does not imply that there is a 
single homogeneous time period associated with every member of the extension of the noun  10, 
e.  g.  (10). 
(46)  Direktorom  on bolel 
Director-instr he ill-past 
He was i11  as a director/whenever he was a director 
The time period of being a child associated with somebody is homogenous.  Not so the period 
of being a director associated with aperson. There may be several periods when the he of (46) 
was a director which are separated by times when he was not. Now, what (10) may mean is that 
at least some times when he was a director he was ill, but may also mean that each time he was 
a director he was ill. The second reading is no longer a conjunction, but rather a conditional. 
We  seem to relativise the assertion that he was ill to  either some or to  a11  relevant periods. 
The accompanying change seems to be from the conjunction to the conditional.  This change 
is easily explainable, if we note that we have a distribution of IIDPinstrll.  In  other words, if 
the restriction of the situation can distribute, we get a conditional, if not, a conjunction.  Such 
effects are well-known with definite plural DPs.  The interesting thing is that we do not have a 
plural here. 
Second, there is  a certain pragmatic implicature in case of (45).  This sentence is perfectly 
OK only when the person referred to by he is not a child at the time of utterance!  Otherwise 
it is infelicitous. This implicature is unexpectable, if we have to do with a simple conjunction. 
But it can be explained by pragmatic factors, if we assurne that the temporal interval provided 
by the predicate in the instrumental should playa role different from the one played by time of 
the utterance or the time of the situation which sets the index of the model, and should restrict 
10  A set S with the join operation n is homogenous, iff for any two objects 
(i) if  e, E S,  e2  E S,  then e, n e2  E S (cumulativity), 
(ii) if e E S,  and e =  e, n e2,  then e, ES, e2  E S (distributivity). 
As usual, join is a binary commutative and associative operation. 
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the situation. 
To render these intuitions about restrictions formal we need the possibility of referring to 
separate temporal stages of the same individual plus the referenee time of the situation, ts, and 
not simply the time of the situation. The difference is this: whereas we took the time of situation 
to be simply the temporal index of a model, the reference time of a situation is a restriction of 
this index for the purpose of making some part of predication in the situation only with respect 
to the restricted index. We will retain the notation t s for the reference time, and will not bother 
to expIicitely specify the time of situation any longer, since reference times of situations seem 
to be sufficient. We shall comment on our use of the term situation in amoment, and suggest a 
first approximation to the semantic representation of (45). 
We must restrict the situation in which there exists a person referred to by he to the time 
specified by the D Pinstr reb'  onok (child), and then evaluate the rest of the sentence with respect 
to the restricted temporal interval. But to be able to accommodate the implicature that the person 
is no Ion ger a child, we separate the universe of the discourse structure into two uni verses. The 
one is the general uni  verse of the situation, the other is the uni verse of the restrictor. This gives 
us a quantifier-like representation, in wh  ich the overall situation of utterance is not represented 
by a discourse referent, whereas the restricted situation is represented. The restrictor is the left 
sub-box, the predication is the right sub-box. 
unaw 
s ts  e 
(47)  before(t  ..  now)  he(u) 
ts  = t  be-ill(e, u) 
childt(x)  theme(e) = u x = u 
Here t  in  the abbreviation childt(x) denotes the time when child(x) is  true.  Evidently, the 
additional predication t s  =  t is  a new hypothesis.  The interpretation of the whole structure is 
like this: the sentence is true in a model if the DR embeddable. It is embeddable, if 
(i) the restrictor is embeddable, and 
(ii) the embedding of the restrictor may be extended to that of the predication 
What happens is the following: we hypothesise that the subject is the referent of the predication 
associated with the instrumental. Presumably because there is al ready one predication structure 
for the subject (built on the main verb), and the addition of a new parallel predication structure 
is achieved via a conjunction, a different hypothesis is put forward.  This hypothesis is to take 
temporally dependent DPs as restrictors of the situation. It  yields a quasi-quantificational struc-
ture of the situation.  Note that this cannot be simply a conjunction, because this is a different 
hypothesis.  In fact,  as we shall discuss at the end of next section, the restrictor is  a kind of 
presupposed information. 
The relation between the reference time of the situation and the time of the event associated 
with the verb is  indirect.  On (he) in (45) need not be ill all  through the time he was a child. 
Therefore we need an additional event referent. The identification ofthe two discourse referents 
for the individuals is possible on some additional assumptions, e.  g.  that a child grows up to 
become an adult, but remains the same person. 
Now the use of the situation becomes adeviation from the standard DRT-apparatus, and we 
will try to cJarify our use of the term. 
17 A. Demjjanow/A. Strigin 
4.4.  Situation 
There are different traditions of the use of situations in  semanties.  The most widespread 
one is to conceive of them as total models and relativise all the pertinent semantic relations to 
a model, if necessary, and not refer to situations explicitely (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet, 
1990). This is the classical Fregean approach. Situation theory with its staring point in Barwise 
and Perry (1983) is  a radical departure from the bulk of assumptions of Fregean-type natural 
language semanties.  Situations are conceived here as  information objects.  Yet  another way 
of using situations is  to take them to be a kind of object in  itself,  a kind of individual in  the 
sorted domain of different kinds of individuals. This use is found in Kratzer (1989) and Berman 
(1987). If semantic interpretations of situations are used at all, this is the closest to our demands. 
But we need somewhat different aspects of situations. Situations should serve as reference 
points which specify the information available in them, but we would not like to identify them 
with that information. We therefore divorce situations from information and make them entities 
in the domain on the one hand.  But on the other hand we will treat them as  contexts which 
guide interpretation and provide useful information for that purpose. 
Consider (48). The date provides a temporal anchor for the event of Peter's sleeping. 
(48)  On March, 21, 1990, Peter slept. 
As is well-known, if some such anchors are not available, they are obtained by inference. If the 
information which can be inferred is  not enough, the sentence sounds strange or infelicitous. 
Thus (49) is hardly interpretable as an assertion at all out of the context, because the temporal 
anchors are very weak and we cannot resolve the temporal ambiguity. 
(49)  Peter slept. 
The date in  (48)  is not necessarily predicated of the time of sleep.  The exact nature of the 
relation between the temporal anchor and the time of sleep is not definitely specified. His sleep 
need not take place during the whole time characterised as March, 21,  1990, and the relation 
may be more like that of inclusion. So we may resort to the concept of situation and say that the 
time of this situation was on March, 21, 1990, and Peter slept at some time during the situation. 
We thus temporally specified a context of inferential behaviour. 
It might seem that this move is representationally superfluous, but actually this indexing by 
a context has interesting consequences. Further discourse may shift the context by extending the 
situation with material from common ground or in other ways which involve temporal indexing. 
Therefore, inferences about temporal indexes could become dependent on the situation. 
Let (50) be the continuation of the story of Peter. 
(50)  This was a good thing to do, because March, 21,  1999, was a bleak and cold day 
We  would like to infer that Peter slept at  some time during the day  and that day was  a part 
of March, 21,  1999.  We cannot consider the inference about Peter's sleeping during the day 
as  generally given.  It depends on  the assumption that the causative relation should connect 
relevant statements, and bleak days are the reason for the characteristics good for sleeping only 
if it takes part during them.  So we treat the situation description as a kind of context and limit 
our inference that Peter slept during the day to this context. 
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We would not speculate here on what information from the sentence can serve as an anchor, 
except the temporal and the existential.  But we would like to be able to  collect all relevant 
anchors from a sentence separately, The rest of the representation of the sentence is then taken 
relative to these anchors, To give an example, (51) is the first attempt at a partitioning into the 
anchors and the assertion part the representation for (48), Here, s is the discourse referent (DR 
for short) of situation, now is the time of now, p is the DR for Peter. 
nowp 
(51) 
s ts  e 
before(t., now) peter(p) 
M arch21 (ts )  sleep(e, p) 
We have two kinds of anchors here:  the temporal information and the condition introduced by 
the proper noun.  We also implicitely index the predicate sleep(  e, p) to the time of situation ts' 
i.e.  we put it into a context. Putting things into contexts is what situations are for. 
The notion of situation is thus dependent on the notion of context, which is just as rubbery 
and needs a theory.  The theory of context we would like to have should be modelIed after 
McCarthy (1993) and McCarthy and Buvac (1997)11.  For theoretical reasons these two papers 
make a distinction between contexts and situations, but make it possible to assign a context to 
any situation. We see no need to follow them in this paper. 
Collecting some information about a situation separately as anchors gives this information 
a kind of presuppositional status:  whether we assurt something about the situation anchored 
in a particular way or deny something about it,  it should remain the same situation due to the 
anchoring. We may now identify the anchors with the restrictor on situations which we needed 
to account for the temporal ! use of the insturnental.  This move has some explanatory power, 
because in the case of the temporal!  use of instr this presuppositional status can indeed be 
observed. The temporal restriction by a D Pinste is like a kind of presupposition. A denial of the 
assertion still refers to the period when the person was a child (52). 
(52)  On reb'onkom ne  bole! 
He child-instr  not ill was 
He was not ill as a child 
This fact is reminiscent of Frege's argument about existential presuppositions of proper names. 
Frege argued that if the names were not presupposing their bearers, but rather asserting their 
existence, the denial of 
(53)  Kepler discovered Neptun 
wou!d have been equivalent to 
(54)  Kepler did not discover Neptun, or there was no Kepler. 
which is usually not the intended meaning, Similarly with (52) or (55). 
(55)  On diektorom  ne  bolel 
He director-instr not ill was 
He was not ill as a director 
11  See Strigin (1999) for an attempt to integrate their theory into a 1inguistic description. 
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The normal interpetation is the one which denies that he was ill when he was a director, and not 
the disjunction of the negations. 
4.5.  Temporal instr 2 
There are some interesting problems with the temporal use of the instrumental case.  The 
most interesting one is that of temporal nouns in instrumental. We call these nouns distributive 
temporal predicates, for reasons which will immediately become obvious. 
A noun like  Zeta  (summer) is  predicated of a temporal discourse referent,  and not of the 
subject.  We  consider this referent to be the reference time of the situation,  i.e.  a temporal 
anchor of the situation. 
(56)  Letom  on bole! 
Summer-instr he ill 
He was ill this summer/in summer 
The representation is straightforward. 
now  uez 
s ts 
(57)  before(t., now)  he(u) 
ts  = t  be-ill(e,u) 
summer(t)  th(e) = u 
The curious thing about this use is  that some rather similar temporal uses of nouns denoting 
temporal measure units are impossible. 
(58)  *Casom  on cital 
Hour-instr he read 
He was reading for an hour/this hour 
If the unit is used in the accusative, the sentence is OK with the durative reading of the D Pace. 
(59)  Cas  on cital 
Hour-acc he read 
He was reading for an hour 
Distributive temporal predicates e.  g.  den' (day), can be used in both ways. But only in the use 
requiring the instrumental such words cannot be modified by ceZyj (whoie). 
(60)  on  cital (*celym)  dnem 
He read (*whole-instr) day-instr 
He was reading the whole day 
(61)  on  cital (celyj)  den 
He read (whole-acc) day-acc 
He was reading (the whole)/for a day 
20 Real Adjuncts in Instrumental in Russian 
We proposed that D Pinstr in such use are situation restrictors, i. e.  anchors.  We may therefore 
provisionally conclude, that temporal measure units are probably bad anchors.  The accusative 
is then the case which is reserved for duratives. 
If  so, there must be some characteristics distinguishing good temporal an chors from durative 
use.  Indeed, there is a substantial difference between the two kinds of temporal predicates. The 
ones  we call  distributive predicates  are  really distributive.  Any  part of summer is  summer. 
Units are not:  no part of a week is a week.  The modifier celyj (whoie) disallows ditribution. 
Distribution correlates with  quantificational structures.  So,  if we  assume that the  anchoring 
function of temporal predicates (i.  e.their functioning as restrictors) requires the preservation of 
the potential for distributivity, temporal units are excluded. 
However, one may think that if temporal units are pluralized, they should acquire the ability 
to distribute, if the theory of plural in Krifka (1989) is assumed.  This seems to be born out at 
first, because temporal unit nouns in plural can be used in free instrumental. 
(62)  Casami  on cital 
Hour-instr he read 
He was reading for hours on end 
However, there is still a difference with distributive predicates.  A plural temporal unit is prob-
ably best regarded as predicated of the event or state of the situation, and not of its  reference 
time. 
This can be easily shown. Perfectivizing the verb immediately blocks the interpretation with 
the plural unit, but not with distributive temporal predicates in singular. 
(63)  *Casami  on proCital knigu 
Hour-instr he read  the book 
He read the book in hours 
(64)  Vecerom  on proCital knigu 
Evening-instr he read  the book 
He read the book (to the end) in the evening 
The complex event:  state after it which is  characteristic of Russian perfectivisation is  not 
distributive.  It should be, however, because of the homomorphic requirement associated with 
the distribnutive nature of the temporal referent of casami (hours-instr).  This homomorphism 
is the comerstone of the theory in Krifka (1992). No homomorphism is requred from temporal 
noun anchors, which are singular and distribute on demand, and not maximally.  Thus, (65) is 
OK, (66)  is out, but if we let dvazdy (twice) have scope over nedel'asami (weeks-instr), the 
sentence becomes OK with the durative reading for nedel'ami,(67) . 
(65)  Letom  on dvaidy bolel 
Summer-instr he  twice  ill 
He was twice ill this summer/in summer 
(66)  *Nedel'ami on dvazdy bolel 
Weeks-instr he twice  ill-past 
For weeks he was twice ill 
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(67)  On dVaZdy bole  I  nedel' ami 
He twice  iII-past weeks-instr 
He was twice i\I for weeks. 
The same operation can be done on (65).  The interpretation is that he was twice iII in summer 
(different summers), but not that he was twice iII during the whole summer (different or same). 
We  may cautiously conc\ude that the additional  hypothesis which interprets the D Pinste 
which is  temporally dependent or a ditributive temporal  predicate is  that it characterises the 
reference time of the situation, and that this time is not indentical with the time of the event 
of the situation.  What we still did not explain is the strange requirement on such D P;nstr  of 
ditributivity on demand, which seems to be associated with this hypothesis.  We do not have a 
good explanation at present. 
5.  Discussion and conclusions 
We would now like to sum the developments of the paper up. 
We proposed that the three adjunct uses of D Pinste  should be treated as having a uniform 
structure.  This is the structure of predication within a small clause.  The choice forced us  to 
postulate a uniform interpretation for  D P;nstr  in  such structures.  This presented a problem of 
accounting for the polysemy in the three free D Pinste-adjuncts. 
We proposed an abductive theory of interpretation which can handle this problem without 
assigning these three different meanings to each DP;nste. It is based on inferring the referent of 
predication within the description of the situation, and possibly making additional hypotheses. 
The theory seems to work, but there are some questions to be answered yet. 
Is there a better alternative using another syntactic structure? Sentences like (68) show that 
some syntactic constraints are operative12,  so the structure is important. There is no reading on 
which the advice was given when Peter was a child. Under the syntax of Pr  P the dative object 
is the complement to Va, and not the specifier of Pr  P, and cannot control PRO. 
(68)  *On uze  reb' onkomi sovetoval Petrui begat 
He  al ready child-instr  advised  Peter  to run/jog 
He advised Peter to jog al ready as a child 
While the theory of Bailyn explains this, we are not aware of other comparable syntactic so-
lutions which would explain this restriction and treat the assignment of INSTR uniforrnly.  If 
Bailyn's theory is adopted, however, we see no way of a lexical treatment of instrumental ad-
juncts in the way Wunderlich (1997) proposes for secondary predication. Wunderlich's proposal 
is suggestive here, because the instrumental case can be the case of secondary pedicaion, too. 
Note that since the Pr  P  c\ause responsible for the cases under consideration is  attached 
to the I P  node we can speculate on the role of syntactic scope.  We  spoke about semantic 
control in Russian in section 1.1.. We actually meant the possibilities ofthe identification of the 
discourse referent introduced by PRO with some discourse referent in the domain of the DRS. 
We might define an accessibility order on the uni verse of the DRS wh ich depends on syntactic 
scope, i.e.  on the c-command relation.  We can postulate that the identification of a DR u with 
the DR of PRO (i. e.  semantic control) can take place only if the P RO-node discourse referent 
12  We are working on the problem of how to handle these syntactic constraints in inference. 
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can access u  in  the c-command ordering.  if this convention is  adopted,  then the attachment 
site at I P would only allow the identification of the disourse referents which have no syntactic 
realisation. The temporal use I case, when the subject provides the DR to control PRO would 
then have the same structure, as (8).  Indeed, this position might be a good alternative proposal 
for all kinds of Pr  P-Adjuncts. We have not yet clarified the relative merits ofthe two proposals. 
Another problem is that of the scope of the treatment. We proposed that any discourse ref-
erent in  the domain of the situation can serve as  the subject of predication.  Some discourse 
referents in  the domain of the discourse representation of the situation seem never to be able 
to be the subjects of instr-predication.  This can be formally reflected,  but is conceptually un-
satisfactory without an  explanation.  We used discourse referents for the source and the goal 
ofmovement in movement situations, for instance, following Kamp and Rossdeutscher (1994). 
But these referents do not seem to enter the predication relation.  However, it can probably be 
argued that ls  and I  9  are not legal semantic referents for either core or periferal grammatical 
cases, since they are narrowly connected to PP-adjuncts.  This line of thought requires a more 
elaborate picture of situation types and their discourse referents (Strigin, 1999, discusses some 
similar cases).  In  case it is  viable,  it can also be a contribution to a theory of the semantic 
PRO-control in Russian. 
The three uses of the free instrumental are not the on1y ones, as  (1 f)  showed. We intend to 
extend the theory to all non-idiosyncratic uses of the instrumental case, including the construc-
tion of secondary predication in Russian, but this is future work. 
What we hope to obtain as a side effect of providing an interpretation of sentences with a 
DPinstr is 
•  to provide a contribution to the constructional conception of meaning (meaning in con-
text); 
•  to provide a contribution to the study of the interpretation of adjuncts; 
•  to further develop the inferential approach to semantic interpretation. 
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A  Appendix. The Semantic Basics of DRT 
For the sake of better integration of thee results of this work into general semantic theory 
we present a small portion of the discourse representation theory, DRT. The main references are 
Kamp and Reyle (1993), Kamp and Rossdeutscher (1994), Cooper et al. (1994), Asher (1993). 
The exposition here follows mostly Cooper et al. (1994). The definition of the part of a language 
of DRT used in this paper is given in (I). 
(I)  The vocabulary of a simple DRS language consists of 
(i)  a set Gons of individual constants, e. g.  naw 
(ii)  a set Ref of discourse referents 
(iii)  a set Pred of predicate constants 
(iv)  a set Bym of logical symbols, e.  g.  =,--> 
The set of terms Terms =  {Gonst URe!} 
A discourse representation structure (DRS) is  essentially a set of discourse individuals (the 
universe of DRS) with a set of conditions on them wh ich are  required to hold in a situation 
modelIed. 
(2)  DRSs and DRS conditions are usually defined by simultaneous 
recursion,  but since our example DRS  are all  simple,  we leave 
the recursive protion of the definition of conditions out. 
(i)  if U is a (possibly empty) set of discourse referents Xi  E Ref, 
GON a (possibly empty) set of conditions conj, 
then < U, GON> is a DRS and U is its universe 
(ii)  if Xi, ... Xj  E Ref, then Xi  = Xj  is a condition 
(iii)  if Ci E Gonst and Xj  E Ref, then Ci  =  Xj  is a condition 
(iv)  if Pis an n-place relation name in Rel and t1, ...  tn  E Terms, 
then P(  t1, ...  , tn) is a condition 
DRS are defined in (i), atomic conditions in  (ii)-(iv).  There are no complex conditions in 
our language.  There are two logical symbols used in the examples which do not occur in the 
definition of a condition, & and -->. Neither is needed in the standard development of the DRT. 
We  use them in their standard logical meaning only to compute the semantic representations 
and do not want to use any of the deduction rules of the DRT for this purpose.  The move is 
harm1ess, but since we do not attempt to integrate the logical terminology, we simply take care 
that standard modell-theoretical notions of DRT are defined on DRS which contain the results 
of abductive inferencing and no exressions containing & and -->. 
In the model theory of this fragment of DRT we represent the world by a total model M  =< 
U, 'S > with U the domain of individuals of M  and 'S the interpretation function of M, wh ich 
maps constants in G onst into elements of U  and n-ary relation names in Rel into elements of 
the the set p(Un ). A total model evaluates all sentences ofthe language we model as eithertrue 
or false.  We want a discourse representation structure (DRS) K  =< U, GON> to come out 
true in M, if its discourse referents u  E  U are mapped into the elements of U in  such a way 
that under this mapping all the conditions Coni  E GONK come out true in M. Let 9 [y]  f  be an 
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extension g of f, i. e. a funetion such that Dom(g) = Dom(f) U y 
(3)  (i)  h  f=M,g< U, GON> iff h [U] g and for all coni E GON: 
f=M,h coni 
(ii)  f=M,g Xi  = Xj  iff g(Xi) = g(Xj) 
(iii)  f= M,g Ci = X iff 'S( Ci) = g(x) 
(iv)  f= M,g P(tl , ... ,in) iff< g(tl ), ... ,g(tn )  >E 'S(P) 
A mapping from K  to M  like in (3) is ealled a verifying embedding of  K  into M. 
(4) 
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